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 1 
Generalisations, Causal Relationships, and Moral Responsibility 
 
Federico Picinali 
 
 
1.Introduction 
In Chapter 4 of his book Character in the Criminal Trial, Mike Redmayne addresses a series of 
non-epistemic arguments against the use of bad character evidence. Mike is particularly 
successful in debunking arguments focusing on the defendant’s autonomy. According to 
these arguments, it is morally wrong to prove the defendant’s guilt by relying on 
behavioural generalisations 1  about groups of which the defendant is a member; in 
particular, if the defendant has previous convictions, it is morally wrong to rely on 
generalisations concerning the recidivism rate of people with previous convictions. Using 
this information – the arguments claim – is ‘inconsistent with the law’s commitment to treat 
the defendant as an autonomous individual, free to determine and alter his conduct at each 
moment.’2 In particular, using previous convictions as just described amounts to treating 
the defendant ‘as if her past conduct determines her present conduct’3 and is ‘dismissive of 
his capacity to revise, or act against, his bad character.’4 While Mike is firm in denying that 
the use of previous convictions has a moral cost, his thoughts concerning the use of 
behavioural generalisations that do not express recidivism rates are more tentative. 5 
                                                        
 Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am indebted to Jules Holroyd for the 
invaluable exchanges I had with her during the research for this paper and for her very helpful comments on a 
previous draft. I especially thank Amit Pundik for helping me to avoid misrepresentations of his view. 
1 With the expression ‘behavioural generalisation’ I am referring to generalisations concerning the behaviour 
of individuals. More precisely, behaviour must feature in the second term of the generalisation for it to be 
‘behavioural’ – although it may also feature in the first term. Consider, for example, a generalisation stating 
that ‘cyclists in London are very likely to wear helmets’. The first term is ‘being a London cyclist’. The second 
term is the behaviour consisting in ‘wearing an helmet’. Notably, the second term of a generalisation is its 
focus, being the fact ‘in question’. The first term, instead, represents a ‘starting point’. On the definition of 
‘generalisation’ see Picinali (2012) at 199-201. 
2 Wasserman (1991) at 943. 
3 Duff et al. (2007) at 114. 
4 Ho (2008) at 300. 
5 Redmayne (2015) at 77-86.  An example of such generalisations used by Mike is:  ‘young men who have 
served in the armed forces are three times more likely to commit crimes of violence than members of the 
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Inspired by the early drafts of Chapter 4 – which I had the honour to read – I researched the 
question as to whether the use of these generalisations in criminal trials is morally 
problematic. As a result of this research, I published an article6 where I concluded that I had 
been unable to find or formulate a decisive moral argument against their use. At the time of 
writing the article, however, I was not aware of – and was not capable of formulating 
myself – a beguiling argument concerning the use of behavioural generalisations, 
formulated and defended by Amit Pundik in a recent research paper.7 Had I been aware of 
this argument, I would have certainly addressed it in my work; I am confident that the 
same holds true for Mike and his Chapter 4. Thus, in addressing Pundik’s argument here I 
intend both to follow the trajectory of Mike’s work and to provide additional support for 
my earlier conclusion.  
In section 2 of this article I present Pundik’s argument. In section 3 I raise three general 
concerns with the argument. In section 4 I formulate some specific criticisms, based on the 
analysis of the essential structures of bad character inferences. In fact, these criticisms 
restate, and elaborate on, some of the points already advanced in section 3. The conclusion 
of the article is that the problems raised by Pundik’s argument, although intriguing, should 
not affect the use of behavioural generalisations in criminal trials. 
 
2.Generalisations and individual freedom: where does the problem lie? 
Consider a generalisation stating that ‘people with gambling debts are very likely to steal’. 
This generalisation is ‘behavioural’, in that it concerns the behaviour of individuals,8 e.g., 
whether or not they steal. Pundik premises his argument about behavioural generalisations 
with the claim that only generalisations reflecting a causal relationship should be used to 
draw inferences about the defendant’s behaviour. There are three important clarifications to 
make with regard to this premise. First, the notion of ‘causation’ that Pundik seems to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
general public’ (at 78). Mike also hypothesizes generalisations expressing the statistical incidence of 
misconduct in a racial or an ethnic group. These generalisations are not about recidivism rates, as they do not 
concern a group of offenders. 
6 Picinali (2015). 
7 Pundik (2015). 
8 For a more accurate definition of ‘behavioural generalisation’ see n 1 above. 
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appeal to is not the strong notion of ‘but-for’ causation. It is, instead, the weaker notion of 
‘necessitation’ or ‘determination’, according to which an event – e.g. having gambling debts 
– causes another – e.g. stealing – if the latter is necessitated or determined by the former. 
For the presence of the causal relationship it is not also required that the latter event would 
not have obtained in the absence of the former. Second, the causal relationship thus 
understood may link the two terms of the generalisation – e.g., having gambling debts and 
stealing – or each term to a common cause, not appearing in the generalisation – e.g., the 
fact of being a prodigal person. Third, Pundik remarks that it is not necessary that we 
identify the causal relationship at play. However, for the generalisation to be used in a 
criminal trial, it must be such that it would be reasonable to expect that an underlying 
causal relationship exists. The generalisation in the example seems to meet this 
requirement, as it would be reasonable to expect that a causal relationship exists either 
between the fact of having gambling debts and the fact of stealing, or between an ulterior 
fact – e.g., being a prodigal person – and each term. If we didn’t posit this requirement and 
claimed, instead, that the presence of a statistical correlation is sufficient, nothing would 
prevent the use of ‘spurious’ generalisations – such as an hypothetical generalisation 
reflecting the striking correlation between the number of people who drowned by falling 
into a pool between 1999 and 2009 in the US, and the number of movies that Nicolas Cage 
appeared in, in each of those years.9 Generalisations of this sort – Pundik points out – are 
not hard to produce, if one relies on a sufficiently large set of variables and a sufficiently 
large database. Indeed, it would be possible to come across spurious behavioural 
generalisations that may be relevant to criminal fact finding. However, these generalisations 
are called ‘spurious’ for a reason: we are unable to make sense of them; we cannot discern a 
meaningful connection between their terms, other than that indicated by the correlation. 
Therefore, it would be unsafe and, possibly, irrational for us to rely on them in order to 
draw inferences. Now, I am not interested in assessing Pundik’s premise on causation, or 
                                                        
9  Cf. http://www.tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations (last accessed 27 October 2015). This ridiculous 
generalization may state that ‘movies featuring Nicholas Cage increase the risk of accidental death by 
drowning in swimming pools in the US’. 
 4 
discussing it further. I accept it for the sake of argument, because the more interesting 
claims lie ahead. It is sufficient for me to recognise that many of the behavioural 
generalisations mentioned in the scholarly debates presented in Mike’s Chapter 4 seem 
indeed to have an underlying causal relationship.10  
Criminal trials – Pundik claims – are chiefly concerned with attributing moral 
responsibility11 to an individual. According to Pundik, in order for us to conclude that an 
individual is morally responsible, we must prove, or at least presuppose, that she was free 
to determine her own behaviour. This implies that we should not prove the individual’s 
responsibility by resorting to generalisations that deny her freedom: to do so would be 
irrational. But what generalisations deny our freedom? This – Pundik remarks – will 
depend on what we posit as the necessary conditions for acting freely, that is, for exercising 
free will. Notoriously, incompatibilists argue that if the world were deterministic – in 
particular, if facts of the past together with the laws of nature entailed every truth about our 
future actions – we could not have free will. Among the incompatibilists are the ‘hard 
determinists’, who believe that in fact the world is deterministic. As a result, they conclude 
that we don’t have free will. Pundik leaves this school of thought aside,12 to concentrate 
only on the incompatibilist ‘libertarians’, who claim that determinism is, indeed, false. 
Compatibilist thinkers, instead, argue that even if our actions are determined by antecedent 
events we may still enjoy free will. The bottom line is that, depending on whether we are 
incompatibilists or compatibilists, the fact that our actions are not determined by antecedent 
events, respectively is or is not a necessary condition of free will.  
                                                        
10 Consider, for example, generalisations stating that ‘people who committed burglary in the past are n likely to 
commit burglary again’, or that ‘people who are violent towards objects are n likely to be violent towards 
individuals’, or that ‘people who served in the armed forces are n likely to commit violent crimes.’ In section 4 
I will make some remarks concerning the causal relationships that seem to underlie these generalisations. 
11 Pundik uses the term ‘culpability’ rather than ‘moral responsibility’. However – based on his paper and on 
our exchanges – I am confident that we mean the same thing. I prefer to use the latter expression, as in the 
literature the term ‘culpability’ is sometimes used to refer to mens rea elements only. Also, Pundik recognizes 
that his argument may not apply at all, or may not apply with the same strength, to crimes that do not track 
moral wrongs – e.g. some regulatory offences. All references to ‘responsibility’ in the paper should be read as 
references to ‘moral responsibility’. 
12 In fact, a ‘hard determinist’ may reject the whole enterprise of criminal justice, at least to the extent that it is 
based on a retributivist rationale. 
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Now, consider a fanciful generalisation stating that ‘at sunset every person with a 
particular pattern of skin marks is subjected to an urge to attack everyone around her’.13 
Assume that the generalisation is reliable and that a scientific study of the phenomenon has 
proven that both the pattern of skin marks and the urge are caused by the exposure to a 
toxic substance; thus, the generalisation is not spurious. John is tried for attacking Steve at 
sunset and the police discover that he has the relevant pattern of skin marks. The 
prosecution wants to rely on the above generalisation in order to infer that John attacked 
Steve. Given this scenario, Pundik makes two claims about the admissibility of the 
generalisation and of the related inference. 1)If we were libertarians, we should admit this 
evidence only on the condition of acquitting John for not being responsible. In fact, the 
generalisation and the inference presuppose that John’s behaviour was determined by an 
antecedent event. Therefore, if the inference is warranted – that is, if the generalisation 
applies to John’s case14 – John cannot have acted freely; thus, he cannot be responsible for 
the crime. If the inference is not warranted, this should be sufficient reason to exclude it, 
together with the underlying generalisation. 2)If we were compatibilists and the evidence were 
such that ‘its use presupposes a causal factor which is one of the causal factors rendering behaviour 
unfree according to the respective compatibilist criteria,’15 then we should admit the evidence only on 
the condition of acquitting John for not being responsible. Even though, as compatibilists, we 
would claim that indeterminism is not a necessary condition for free will, depending on our 
account of freedom we may maintain that some causal connections between antecedent 
events and individual behaviour deny the freedom of such behaviour. For instance – 
Pundik exemplifies – a compatibilist may argue that an agent has acted freely only if she 
would have acted differently had she wanted to.16  If it were the case that the causal 
                                                        
13 This is roughly the same example used by Pundik at 15 ff. 
14 For the inference to be warranted it is necessary both that the underlying generalisation is reliable – which is 
the case ex hypothesi – and that John’s case falls within the group of cases to which the generalization applies. 
As I will point out later, concluding that the generalisation applies to the defendant’s case, does not entail the 
conclusion that the defendant acted as the generalisation states. This conclusion will depend on how high is 
the probability expressed in the generalisation. In John’s case, the generalisation being universal, if we 
conclude that it applies to his case we are also bound to conclude that he acted as the generalisation states. 
15 Pundik (2015) at 19. 
16 Ibid. 
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connection between the exposure to the substance and the urge to attack bypasses the 
desires/intentions of the individual – in other words, that the individual would attack 
others irrespective of her actual desires/intentions – then our compatibilist would claim that 
the generalisation and the inference are only admissible on the condition of acquitting. If 
the inference is warranted – that is, if the generalisation applies to John’s case – it shows 
that John was not acting freely under this compatibilist account of freedom and, therefore, 
that he was not responsible. If the inference is not warranted, this is sufficient reason to 
exclude it, together with the underlying generalisation.  
Pundik also notes that the two claims hold regardless of whether the generalisation at 
issue is universal – e.g., ‘every person…is subjected to an urge’ – or not – e.g., ‘most 
persons…are subjected to an urge’. In fact, he stresses that his theory is mainly concerned 
with generalisations of the latter kind – given that this is the kind of generalisations 
normally used in criminal trials. Whether the generalisation is universal or not, the 
prosecution’s argument would necessarily imply that the causal connection was at play in 
the defendant’s case – in other words, that the defendant’s case falls within the class of cases 
where the connection is operative. Thus, it would be irrational to rely on the generalisation 
and the respective inference in order to prove that the defendant is responsible: if the causal 
connection is operative in John’s case, he has not acted freely and, therefore, he is not 
responsible. Finally, according to Pundik the two claims would apply even if the evidence 
were put forward by the defence; however in this case it would not be irrational for the 
defendant to rely on the generalisation were she aiming to show, precisely, that she was not 
responsible because she was not acting freely.  
The elegance of Pundik’s argument rests in its being noncommittal as to whether 
determinism is true or false, and as to whether incompatibilism is right or wrong. It remains 
to be seen whether, aside from being elegant, it is also a convincing argument. 
 
3.General concerns with the argument 
Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility? 
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Although Pundik’s argument is apparently noncommittal as to whether incompatibilism is 
right or wrong, it does presuppose that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. This 
is a contentious point, and one that is denied by prominent compatibilist theories. These 
theories proceed by ‘confession and avoidance’: libertarians are right in claiming that 
determinism and free will are not compatible; however, they are wrong in claiming that the 
truth of determinism denies responsibility. For these compatibilists – known as semi-
compatibilists – it is conceptually mistaken to posit free will as a necessary condition for 
responsibility and, therefore, it would be conceptually mistaken to argue that there is an 
inconsistency with using generalisations that deny our free will in order to prove our moral 
responsibility.  
Take, for example, Jay Wallace’s compatibilist theory.17 Wallace defines free will as the 
‘availability of a range of alternate possibilities, holding fixed the laws of nature and the 
facts about the past.’18  This definition is by no means peculiar to his account; it is, indeed, 
widely accepted.19 Wallace agrees that free will cannot exist if determinism is true. And yet, 
he contends that the truth of determinism would not deny our responsibility, because the 
latter does not require free will. Responsibility, instead, requires the possession of two 
rational powers of ‘reflective self-control’: that of grasping and applying moral reasons and 
that of controlling behaviour in light of them – where the power to control behaviour 
involves a capacity for critical reflection, a capacity to make choices as a result of 
deliberation, and a capacity to translate choices into action. 20  As Wallace convincingly 
argues, these powers are not denied by the absence of alternative possibilities, which 
determinism entails.21 
                                                        
17 See Wallace (1994), in particular Chapters 5 and 6. Wallace builds on Strawson (1962), famously claiming 
that moral responsibility must be understood in the context of our practice of holding reactive attitudes in 
response to people’s behaviour, and that this practice would not – and should not – be threatened by the 
possible discovery that determinism is true. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Cf. O’Connor (2010), stating at 1 that ‘”Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of 
capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.’ Consider also the 
definition of ‘free will’ underpinning the famous ‘consequence argument’ in van Inwagen (1975). 
20 Wallace (1994) at 157-159. 
21 Id. in particular at 147-153 and 180-186. 
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Take now John Fischer’s and Mark Ravizza’s theory.22 Fischer and Ravizza distinguish 
between two types of control over our agency.23 ‘Regulative’ control consists in the freedom 
to choose between alternative possibilities. This ‘freedom to do otherwise’ – i.e., ‘free will’ 
according to the definition given above – is not required for moral responsibility. 
‘Guidance’ control, instead, is necessary for moral responsibility. Fischer’s and Ravizza’s 
conception of guidance control is complex and I cannot do justice to it here.24 However, 
giving a rough account of this conception is useful, as it helps the reader to appreciate some 
of the points that I will make later. According to Fischer and Ravizza, an agent exercises 
guidance control if her action issues from a mechanism – that is, a set of attitudes and of 
other ‘agential characteristics’ that are relevant to the action25 – which is both owned by the 
agent and moderately reasons-responsive. The mechanism is owned by the agent if she 
takes responsibility for its operation – i.e., she recognises its potential effects on the world 
around her and she accepts that she may be the target of reactive attitudes as a result of her 
action. The mechanism is moderately reasons-responsive if, under various counterfactual 
scenarios where the agent is presented with new, coherent reasons, the mechanism would 
recognise and process these reasons, and possibly – based on one or more of them – would 
cause the agent to act differently from how she actually acted. The exercise of guidance 
control, thus understood, does not require the presence of free will – that is, the ability to do 
otherwise in the actual scenario. 
Pundik’s argument has no purchase with respect to these compatibilist accounts,26 as it 
posits free will as a necessary condition for responsibility.27 Considering the impressive 
influence on the academic debate and the apparent plausibility of both these accounts, the 
power of Pundik’s argument seems considerably reduced by this realisation. Now, Pundik 
                                                        
22 See Fischer and Ravizza (1998). 
23 See id. at 30-34. 
24 See id. Chapters 2, 3, and 8. 
25 On this understanding of ‘mechanism’ see also McKenna and Coates (2015) at 47. 
26 Indeed, there are other prominent compatibilist accounts that reject the claim according to which the 
freedom to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. See, for instance, Strawson (1962), Frankfurt 
(1971), and Arpaly (2002). 
27 To be fair, Pundik briefly discusses some of these accounts in footnote 57 of his manuscript. The discussion 
is, however, inadequate. 
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would have two simple strategies to respond to this concern. The first strategy would be to 
reassert that both of his two claims – addressed, respectively, to the libertarian and to the 
compatibilist – are about free will, however using a definition of ‘free will’ that is different 
from the common definition given above. It remains to be seen what this definition may be 
and how could it work both for the first and the second claim. The second strategy would 
be to reframe his second claim as follows: If we were compatibilists and the evidence were such 
that its use presupposes a causal factor which is one of the causal factors that denies moral 
responsibility according to the respective compatibilist criteria, then we should admit the evidence 
only at the condition of acquitting John for not being responsible. In other words, the strategy 
involves expunging the reference to free will,28 so as to make the claim applicable also to 
theories such as Wallace’s, Fischer’s and Ravizza’s. Considering this strategy is useful, 
because the strategy emphasises a flaw of Pundik’s claim that was already present in its 
original version. Compatibilists have taken different views with respect to the necessary 
conditions for responsibility. Libertarians, on the other hand, at least agree that the presence 
of free will is one such condition – which gives to Pundik’s first claim its extensive reach 
and intuitive power.  Given the variety of compatibilist theories out there and the many 
kinds of causal antecedents that may characterise behavioural generalisations – e.g., objects, 
mental states, medical conditions, actions, natural events, social conditions – it seems that 
both versions of Pundik’s second claim are general to the point that they may appear 
uninteresting. Unless the claim is made more specific – elaborating on the relevant 
conditions for responsibility and on the causal factors that would deny them – and/or an 
effort is made to find a common denominator between the main compatibilist theories, the 
purport of the claim is just too vague to make it a useful directive. Of course, the risk 
involved in specifying the claim is that of making it inapplicable to some prominent 
compatibilist accounts. 
 
Insufficient Causes and Indeterministic Choices 
                                                        
28 Here I am working under the assumption that when Pundik uses the attribute ‘unfree’ in his second claim, 
he means ‘without free will’. He gives no indication that the reader should interpret the term otherwise. 
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Pundik’s first claim – addressed to the libertarian – is not immune to criticism either. The 
causal relationship underlying a behavioural generalisation may be such that the 
antecedent is not a sufficient cause: an additional causal factor is needed for the behaviour 
to ensue.29 This factor may be precisely the individual’s indeterministic – i.e., not entailed by 
antecedent facts – choice to engage in that behaviour. Indeed, since libertarians assume 
indeterminism, it is entirely consistent for them to recognise the possibility of an 
indeterministic choice on the part of the agent, at the same time positing the truth of a 
behavioural generalisation with an underlying causal relationship. Consider the 
generalisation stating that ‘95% of people with disease X act violently’. Assume that there is 
a causal connection between having the disease and acting violently. In other words, in 95% 
of cases the disease causes violent behaviour. This does not exclude that the behaviour 
would not ensue but for the individual’s choice to engage in that behaviour. And, unless we 
are able to identify a sufficient cause for that choice, we must take the choice to be 
indeterministic, and thus free in the sense expressed above.30 Notably, we could conceive of 
a scenario of this sort even if the generalisation were universal: what matters is not the 
probability expressed in the generalisation, but whether the antecedent to which the 
generalisation explicitly or implicitly refers is a sufficient cause. 31  Now, under these 
circumstances many libertarians would have nothing to object to the use of the 
generalisation in order to prove the defendant’s responsibility. Moral responsibility is not 
denied by the generalisation, nor by the inference built upon it, because one of the causal 
                                                        
29 In fact, it does not matter for this objection whether the additional causal factor is always needed. What 
matters is that it may be necessary in the defendant’s case. 
30 As explained later, for this criticism to succeed it is not even necessary that the choice be indeterministic. It 
would be sufficient that the deliberation preceding the choice involve an indeterministic mental event. 
31  However, it would seem that this scenario is more likely to occur with probabilistic behavioural 
generalisations; indeed, that it occurs with any such generalisation, provided that the individual is not denied 
an opportunity to choose whether to act. The ulterior causal factor (i.e., the choice of the individual) may be 
conceived of as an additional relevant trait of the individual case. This trait would allow us to identify a more 
specific reference class than that of the original generalisation – i.e., the class of people with both the ‘original’ 
trait and the trait consisting in ‘choosing to act’. Such reference class would yield a generalisation with a 
higher probability; possibly a probability close to 1 – given that under normal circumstances a choice to act 
brings about the action. Cf. Picinali (2012). A process of ‘gradual specification’ of this sort would not apply if 
the original generalisation were already universal. However, it is possible that also in this case there are one or 
more hidden causal factors that contribute to bringing about the relevant behaviour. In any case, it is doubtful 
whether universal behavioural generalisations exist. 
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antecedents of the agent’s behaviour would be her indeterministic choice to act. The 
presence of a causal link between choice and action is considered unproblematic by many 
libertarians, when the choice is not itself entailed by causal antecedents. Notably, some 
libertarians would reach the same conclusion even if the choice were determined, provided 
that the preceding deliberation involves an indeterministic mental event – e.g., if it is 
undetermined what set of the agent’s beliefs will come to her mind during deliberation.32 
It derives from this objection that Pundik’s first claim is imperfect. In order to avoid the 
objection the claim should be rephrased so as to apply only if: 1) the causal antecedent of 
the relationship underlying the generalisation is a sufficient cause in the defendant’s case; 2) 
or it can be excluded that an indeterministic choice to act is within the sufficient set of 
causes that brought about the defendant’s behaviour and, if there is a deterministic choice 
within such set, that the deliberation preceding the choice involves an indeterministic event. 
The problem with this revised version of the claim is that its application requires an 
explanatory inquiry that the court – if anyone at all – is simply unable to undertake. True, 
there may be cases where we can reasonably exclude that the defendant made any choice or 
engaged in any deliberation at all – e.g., a case of automatism due to an epileptic seizure. In 
these clear cases a libertarian court may confidently say that Pundik’s first claim applies. 
However, these cases are already covered by well-known defences, which casts doubts on 
the need to be guided by Pundik’s ‘metaphysical’ claim in the first place. Imagine that the 
prosecution were so daft to argue that the defendant is responsible for assault because a 
generalisation, stating that ‘people with an epileptic fit are almost certain to hit people 
around them,’ applies to her case. Were the prosecution to advance such a self-defeating 
argument, there certainly would be no need for giving the defendant the additional 
safeguard of Pundik’s first claim, nor would the claim add anything to our understanding 
of the defendant’s situation. If the generalisation applies to the defendant, it means that she 
has acted as an automaton and therefore isn’t responsible. What is more, outside the clear 
                                                        
32  For examples of libertarian theories that support the claims in this paragraph, consider the theories 
discussed in Clarke and Capes (2013) at 9-14, and in Levy and McKenna (2009) at 121-122. See also Kane 
(1996). 
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cases where we can confidently say that the defendant didn’t make a choice or deliberate, 
Pundik’s first claim could not be applied without tackling the very question as to whether 
our world is deterministic or not. Only if we concluded that it is, we may safely exclude the 
presence of an indeterministic choice on the part of the defendant or of an indeterministic 
event in her deliberation. Needless to say, this question is intractable, at least at the current 
state of our knowledge. Surely we don’t expect the court or the fact finder in a criminal trial 
to make judgments about the truth of such metaphysical theses.33 
Pundik may contend that the objection mounted here is based on too fanciful a state of 
affairs – i.e., that the causal antecedent is not sufficient and that another causal antecedent is 
the indeterministic choice of the agent or a deterministic choice brought about by at least an 
indeterministic mental event. Therefore, Pundik may conclude that the objection does not 
pose any reasonable problem for its first claim. To this I would reply that states of affairs of 
this sort are far from fanciful, as I will show in section 4.34 And I would add that, in any 
case, the debate about responsibility and free will is a cradle of fanciful hypotheticals and 
objections: one should not participate in this debate – or base her theory on it – expecting to 
be immune from such argumentative tools. 
 
A Procedural Concern: Not an Argument About Admissibility 
In the previous subsections I attempted to show that it is far from clear that libertarians and 
compatibilists would have difficulties accommodating generalisations of the sort that 
Pundik problematises. Now I would like to air an additional general concern with Pundik’s 
argument, which refers to the role that the argument is meant to play in the criminal 
process of proof. According to Pundik, his argument concerns the question of admissibility. 
He maintains that if the prosecution advances an inference based on a behavioural 
generalisation in order to prove the defendant’s guilt – and if the conditions presupposed 
by either his first or his second claim apply – the court should admit this evidence only at 
                                                        
33 Finally, were we able to answer the question of determinism and were we to conclude that determinism is 
true, incompatibilists would argue that no one is morally responsible, not just the defendant in the example. 
34 See also n 31 above. 
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the condition of acquitting the defendant. If the court believes that the inference is not 
warranted – i.e., that the generalisation does not apply to the defendant’s case – it should 
not admit the evidence precisely on this ground. The same directives should apply when 
the evidence is presented by the defence in order to show that the defendant was not acting 
freely, the only difference being that in this case the defence would not be advancing an 
inconsistent argument.  
Pundik does not seem to hold that the court should exclude the evidence depending on 
whether such evidence would be inconsistent with the case of the party advancing it – as it 
may be if the prosecution were such party. In other words, the decision on admissibility 
should not be governed by the goal to foster or preserve consistency in the party’s case. 
This, I believe, is a sensible position to take: it would be unreasonable to exclude useful 
evidence only because it does not help the case of the party producing it.35 Pundik seems to 
posit a different criterion for the decision on admissibility: the evidence should be admitted 
only if it is found that the generalisation applies to the defendant’s case.36 However, once 
the evidence is admitted on this ground, the die is cast: the defendant should be acquitted. 
The problem with this approach is that it conflates the question of admissibility with the 
question of fact-finding, and – in the case of a jury system like the English and Welsh – the 
role of the court with the role of the jury. Were I to accept that a defendant may not be 
responsible if a particular behavioural generalisation applied to her case, I would still 
maintain that the question of admissibility does not involve drawing a conclusion as to 
whether the generalisation actually applies to the defendant’s case. Nor does it involve 
drawing a conclusion as to what are the consequences of this for the finding of guilt.37 These 
judgments are part of fact-finding; in the jury system, they are not for the court to make. 
                                                        
35 The regulation of disclosure may be taken as an indication that the consistency of each party’s behaviour is 
not a value protected by the system. Under section 3(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996, the prosecution is required to disclose material that ‘might reasonably be considered capable of 
undermining’ its own case. 
36 In fact, Pundik’s claims leave room for the possibility that the court finds that the generalisation applies to 
the defendant’s case and yet decides not to admit it. It is not clear from Pundik’s theory what other factors 
may the court consider in reaching such decision. 
37 On this second point see n 14 above: claiming that a generalisation applies to the defendant’s case, does not 
yet mean that the defendant engaged in the behaviour stated in the generalisation.  
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The decision whether to admit or exclude the evidence should depend on other criteria 
(e.g., the apparent relevance of the evidence, its potential for prejudicial effect, fairness). 
Possibly, should the evidence be presented by an expert, a special test of reliability may be 
imposed. But it shouldn’t be necessary for a party to prove that the generalisation applies to 
the defendant in order to have it admitted at trial; nor should the question of admissibility 
directly determine the outcome of the trial, lest we undermine the distinction between 
admissibility and fact-finding, and hence the division of labour between the court and the 
jury.38 It is only with fact-finding that, considering all the available evidence, a decision can 
be made on whether the generalisation does or does not apply to the defendant’s case and 
on what are the consequences that this judgment has for the finding of guilt. Moreover, it is 
important to consider that most of the examples used so far involved generalisations 
expressing high probabilities – in particular, probabilities that many would deem sufficient 
to meet the criminal standard of proof. It may well be the case that the parties present 
weaker generalisations. If so, concluding that the generalisation applies to the defendant’s 
case may not be decisive.39 We should also determine whether the respective probability 
meets the reasonable doubt standard – or, if the inference is presented by the defence, 
whether it is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.40 These are determinations that normally 
fall within the province of the fact finder. 
In light of these objections, a more convincing version of Pundik’s theory may be devised 
for a jury system such as the English and Welsh. According to this version, the problem 
raised by Pundik is not to be addressed at the time of deciding whether to admit the 
evidence; it is to be addressed at the time of instructing the jury. If we accepted that a 
generalisation denies the responsibility of the group of people to which it applies – as 
shown above, it is far from clear that Pundik’s argument is useful to identify generalisations 
                                                        
38 This is not to deny that a court may sometimes heavily engage in fact-finding, for instance when it has to 
decide on an application for ‘no case to answer’. 
39 As pointed out in n 14 above, claiming that the generalisation applies to the defendant’s case merely means 
that the defendant falls in the group of people to which the generalisation refers. It does not entail that the 
defendant engaged in the behaviour stated in the generalisation. 
40 In fact, provided that Pundik’s claims and their premises are sound, it seems that the crucial question is the 
latter: if the probability is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the freedom of the defendant at the 
relevant time, the defendant should be acquitted. 
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of this kind – we may want the jury to be instructed that only at the condition of acquitting 
the defendant is it possible to conclude that the generalisation applies to her case. 
 
4.Responsibility and the structures of character inferences 
In this section I put forward more specific criticisms of Pundik’s argument, which restate, 
and elaborate on, points that I previously advanced in a general form. The aim of these 
criticisms is to reinforce the claim that, whether someone is a libertarian or a compatibilist, 
the generalisations with which Pundik takes issue do not deny moral responsibility simply 
in virtue of their status as generalisations that presuppose an underlying causal 
relationship.  
As mentioned in the introduction, Chapter 4 of Mike’s Character in the Criminal Trial 
addresses two types of character inferences. The first type is that of inferences relying on 
generalisations expressing recidivism rates. The inference is between the defendant’s past 
conviction(s) and the criminal behaviour for which the defendant is tried. The inference 
relies upon a generalisation expressing the recidivism rate of individuals with past 
conviction(s) – where the recidivism rate would obviously refer to the criminal behaviour at 
issue. The second type is that of inferences relying on generalisations that do not express 
recidivism rates. Here the inference is between a particular trait of the defendant – the 
membership in a racial, ethnic, social group; the fact that she engaged in particular non-
criminal behaviour; the fact of having a particular job, a particular medical condition etc. – 
and the criminal behaviour for which the defendant is tried. The inference relies on a 
generalisation expressing the statistical incidence of such criminal behaviour within the 
group of people sharing the relevant trait. Both types of inferences are ‘character inferences’ 
as they rely on evidence of previous misconduct on the part of the defendant and/or on 
information concerning the defendant’s disposition towards misconduct.41 
In what follows I work with a different, but coextensive, partition of character inferences, 
that between inferences starting from the defendant’s previous behaviour – be it criminal or 
                                                        
41 Cf. section 98 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
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not – and inferences starting from a trait of the defendant other than behaviour – e.g. her 
membership in a certain ethnic group.42 This partition will allow me to make some – 
admittedly tentative – remarks on the essential structures of character inferences and on the 
possible causal relationship underlying them. In light of these remarks I will try to show 
that it isn’t at all granted that Pundik’s two claims would apply to these inferences. 
However, given that the two types of character inferences that I have identified seem to 
exhaust the potential range of inferences to which Pundik’s claims may apply, the question 
is raised as to what possible applications are left open. As I will argue, Pundik’s claims 
seem to apply only to cases where there is no need for them, since the exculpatory work is 
done by other, more obvious, factors. 
 
Inferences from behaviour 
The defendant behaved in a particular way in the past – e.g., she committed crime X. She is 
now tried for committing crime Y. There is a reliable generalisation stating that ‘95% of 
people who committed crime X later commit crime Y.’43 The prosecution relies on this 
generalisation to claim that the fact finder should infer from the defendant’s previous 
behaviour that she committed crime Y. In ‘inferences from behaviour’, it seems reasonable 
to expect that if the generalisation is reliable, it reflects an underlying causal relationship. A 
plausible relationship is that between a common cause and each term of the generalisation, 
where the common cause consists in the individual’s motivational states – e.g., her beliefs, 
desires, intentions. These states seem the best candidate to explain the previous and the 
subsequent behaviour – e.g., a previous and a subsequent sexual offence may be explained 
by reference to the individual’s desire for sexual gratification and to her belief that sexual 
gratification is best achieved if the other party is not consenting.44 The causal relationship is, 
therefore, triangular, and can be pictured as follows. 
                                                        
42 To clarify, being a member is not behaviour, while becoming a member is. I will say more on the relevance of 
this distinction later. 
43 The assumption, of course, is that the percentage is different (in particular, lower) in the general population. 
Otherwise the previous conviction would be irrelevant and the evidence would be excluded on this ground. 
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The question to ask now is whether Pundik’s claims would have any purchase with respect 
to a behavioural generalisation of this kind. In other words, would compatibilists and/or 
libertarians argue that this generalisation and the respective inference deny the individual’s 
responsibility? It seems obvious that compatibilists like Wallace, Fischer and Ravizza would 
answer the question in the negative, thus contending that Pundik’s second claim does not 
apply to ‘inferences from behaviour’. The presence of a causal link between the 
motivational states and the two terms of the generalisation does not deny their 
requirements for moral responsibility.  
Consider the sketch of Wallace’s conception of ‘reflective self-control’, given in section 3. 
The causal link between motivational states and behaviour does not deny the agent’s grasp 
of the relevant moral reasons, nor the agent’s capacity to critically reflect on these reasons, 
deliberate on them, make choices as a result of such deliberation, and translate these choices 
into action. After all, the agent’s motivational states may be precisely the outcome of 
exercising the powers of reflective self-control. What is more, even if such states were 
themselves entailed by causal antecedents – as it would happen in a deterministic world – 
Wallace would still contend that reflective self-control could be exercised. Consider now the 
sketch of Fischer’s and Ravizza’s conception of ‘guidance control’. The causal link between 
motivational states and behaviour does not deny that the action may have issued from a 
mechanism that is both owned by the agent and moderately reasons-responsive. In fact, the 
MOTIVATIONAL STATES 
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agent may be taking responsibility for the operation of the mechanism – in the sense 
described above. Also, the causal link gives no reason to exclude that there may be a 
counterfactual scenario where, if the agent is presented with a new and coherent reason, the 
mechanism would recognise and process this reason, and possibly – based on it – cause the 
agent to act differently from how she actually acted. Again, these requirements may be 
satisfied even if the motivational states were themselves determined. 
Libertarians too may answer the question in the negative, thus contending that Pundik’s 
first claim does not apply to ‘inferences from behaviour’. Even in the presence of a causal 
link between motivational states and behaviour, a libertarian may argue that responsibility 
for that behaviour is not denied if these motivational states are not themselves entailed by 
causal antecedents. More precisely, the agent may be responsible when, e.g.: it is 
undetermined what set of the agent’s beliefs will come to her mind during deliberation; or 
the agent acts based on a preference or desire that is not itself determined; or the agent’s 
intention is undetermined, because it results from a qualified ‘effort of will’ to resist the 
temptation to act. 45 The bottom line is that a libertarian too may remain unimpressed with 
Pundik’s theory, as applied to ‘inferences from behaviour’. 
 
Inferences from a trait other than behaviour (for brevity, ‘OB inferences’) 
The defendant is a member of an ethnic group, the Xs. She is now tried for committing 
crime Y. There is a reliable generalisation stating that ‘95% of Xs commit crime Y at least 
once in their lifetime.’46 The prosecution relies on this generalisation to claim that the fact 
finder should infer from the defendant’s membership in the ethnic group of the Xs that she 
committed crime Y. In ‘OB inferences’ such as this one, it seems reasonable to expect that if 
the generalisation is reliable, it reflects an underlying causal relationship. Given that the 
first term of the generalisation is not behaviour, a triangular relationship with the 
motivational states of the individual as a common cause seems implausible – after all, as the 
                                                        
45 See the works referenced in n 32 above. 
46 Again, the assumption is that the percentage is different (in particular, lower) in the general population. 
Otherwise the fact of being an E would be irrelevant and the evidence would be excluded on this ground. 
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example shows, the first term may not be something that the individual can bring about.  It 
is plausible, instead, to argue that the relationship is linear: the membership in the ethnic 
group causes certain motivational states that, in turn, cause the criminal behaviour.47 Of 
course, the motivational states may be caused by the membership, together with 
concomitant antecedents – such as the social conditions that the ethnic group enjoys or 
endures. Here, I am making no claim that all ‘OB inferences’ involve generalisations with 
this underlying causal pattern. In particular, generalisations linking physical traits to 
behaviour – such as the fanciful generalisation in John’s case above – may well present a 
triangular pattern and/or may not be underlain by a causal relationship involving 
motivational states. However, the linear pattern just presented seems a plausible 
explanation for a vast array of generalisations relied upon in ‘OB inferences’: in particular, 
generalisations concerning membership in a racial, ethnic, national or social group.48 The 
linear pattern can be pictured as follows. 
 
Picture 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, the question to ask is whether Pundik’s claims would have any purchase with 
respect to a behavioural generalisation of this kind. In other words, would compatibilists 
and/or libertarians argue that this generalisation and the respective inference deny the 
individual’s responsibility? Again, compatibilists like Wallace, Fischer and Ravizza would 
answer the question in the negative, thus contending that Pundik’s second claim does not 
apply to ‘OB inferences’. To see why, it is sufficient to restate a conclusion previously 
                                                        
47 The fact that the motivational states are not expressed in the generalisation may give rise to a version of the 
‘argument from autonomy’ that I have formulated, discussed, and criticised in Picinali (2015) at 5-7. 
48 It is plausible to claim that a triangular pattern – as the one described earlier – is involved in ‘OB inferences’ 
where the individual can choose to become a member of the relevant group: the motivational states may help 
to explain both the choice to become a member and the criminal behaviour. Possibly, in these cases there is a 
combination of a triangular and a linear pattern. I will briefly deal with these cases later. 
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reached: reflective self-control and guidance control are not denied by the linear causal 
chain, because they are not denied by the fact that the motivational states are themselves 
entailed by causal antecedents.49  
As far as libertarians are concerned, a negative answer seems again plausible. To begin 
with, it would be open to the libertarian to claim that if the membership in the group is the 
result of the individual’s choice and if this choice is not itself entailed by causal antecedents, 
the linear causal chain linking membership to behaviour does not deny the individual’s 
responsibility. For instance, according to Robert Kane an individual is ‘ultimately 
responsible’ for an action – e.g. the criminal behaviour – even if the action is causally 
determined – e.g. by the membership and the motivational states – as long as any 
determining cause is, or results, from an action of the agent that is not itself determined – 
e.g., the choice to become a member.50 Moreover, in cases where the membership is the 
result of the individual’s choice, it would be plausible to argue that the causal relationship 
is best captured by a triangular pattern,51 where the motivational states account for the 
decision to join the group and for the subsequent criminal behaviour. If so, the libertarian 
may adopt the very arguments available to her for the case of ‘inferences from behaviour’, 
that I explained above. 
These solutions, however, would not work for cases where the individual has not chosen 
to become a member, possibly because she has been a member of the group since her birth – 
consider the case of racial, ethnic, national and social groups. As regards some of these 
groups – e.g. a national group – the individual may have the opportunity to opt out of the 
group later in her life. If so, the libertarian may argue that the agent is responsible for the 
                                                        
49 So called ‘historical compatibilists’ may argue that it matters for moral responsibility how the agent came to 
satisfy the ‘ahistorical’ conditions for responsibility. In particular, it matters whether an individual has 
reflectively endorsed the motivational states or whether these states are not reflectively endorsed but 
inculcated as a result of abuse and indoctrination. See Levi and McKenna (2009) 108. This does not deny that 
the presence of a causal link between membership in a group and the motivational states is compatible with 
moral responsibility. 
50 See Kane (1996), in particular Chapter 3. Notably, Kane argues that ‘[n]ot all of our morally responsible 
choices or actions (those for which we are truly praiseworthy or blameworthy) have to be such that we could 
have done otherwise with respect to them directly’ (at 40, italics in the original). 
51 Or by a combination between the triangular and the linear pattern. 
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criminal behaviour if: the agent endorsed the membership by deciding not to opt out of the 
group or by not considering this option at all; and if the decision, or the failure to consider 
the option, are not themselves entailed by antecedent events. If these conditions obtained, 
Kane’s requirements for responsibility would seem to be met again, because the causal 
chain that produces the crime would involve an indeterministic behaviour of the agent. As 
for groups that an individual does not have the opportunity to leave – e.g. a racial group – 
the libertarian may follow an argument presented in section 3. What if the motivational 
states caused by the membership were not a sufficient cause of the criminal behaviour? 
What if another causal factor were necessary for the defendant to engage in criminal 
behaviour? It seems perfectly reasonable to argue that, even though the membership in a 
group may cause an individual to have certain motivational states, these states alone cannot 
account for her criminal behaviour. After all, it is reasonable to believe that if the member of 
a particular group – especially a group that the individual belongs to since her birth and has 
no opportunity to leave – engages in criminal behaviour, this behaviour cannot be 
completely accounted for – if at all – by her membership. It seems also necessary that the 
individual choose to engage in criminal behaviour. This choice may be based on the 
motivational states caused by the membership, but need not be entailed by these states. In 
other words, the choice need not be determined by these motivational states; therefore, it 
may not feature in the linear causal chain. If so, it would be open to the libertarian to argue 
that the individual is responsible for the criminal behaviour, as long as her choice is 
indeterministic, or the deliberation preceding the choice involves an indeterministic mental 
event.52 Positing either of these facts is not a stretch for the libertarian, as she assumes that 
indeterminism is true. 
 
What range of application is left for Pundik’s claims? 
As a result of the arguments advanced in this section, it would seem that Pundik’s claims 
would not apply to character inferences. However, these inferences exhaust the potential 
                                                        
52 See n 32 above. 
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range of application of the claims: after all, they encompass all the inferences that involve a 
behavioural generalisation concerning criminal conduct. Therefore, one may conclude that 
no range of application is left for Pundik’s claims. This would be too fast. As I pointed out 
earlier, the linear causal pattern pictured above may not capture the generalisations 
involved in ‘OB inferences’ such as the inference concerning skin marks that was at issue in 
John’s case. If so, the arguments presented above may not apply to these inferences. The 
generalisations on which these inferences rely express a propensity to engage in criminal 
behaviour, but don’t seem to be underlain by a causal relationship that involves the 
motivational states or the choice of the individual: the criminal behaviour is directly 
triggered by a medical condition or an external factor. When confronted with 
generalisations of this kind, it is likely that both the libertarian and the compatibilist would 
argue that the generalisation and the respective inference deny the moral responsibility of 
the individuals to which they apply.53 In fact – referring again to Wallace’s, Fischer’s, and 
Ravizza’s theories – if behaviour is directly triggered by a medical condition or an external 
factor, there is no room for either reflective self-control or guidance control. Moreover – for 
what we know of causal relationships of this kind – it would not be reasonable to argue that 
the medical condition or the external factor are not sufficient causes and that an 
indeterministic choice of the agent may be present as a concomitant causal factor. Therefore, 
both the compatibilists and the libertarians would probably conclude that Pundik’s claims 
successfully apply to these cases. However, the important point to realise here is that in 
these cases we don’t really need to delve into the intricacies of the free will debate in order 
to conclude that the agent is not responsible if the generalisation applies to her case. There 
is a solid and rather convincing body of law telling us precisely that the defendant is not 
responsible, or only partially so: this is the law on insanity, diminished responsibility, and 
automatism. The directives formulated by Pundik don’t seem to add anything new to the 
directives that we already receive from this body of law,54 nor does Pundik’s theory seem to 
                                                        
53 Provided that they express a sufficient probability. 
54 Apart from the fact that, according to Pundik, the problem raised by behavioural generalisations should be 
dealt with already at the admissibility stage. I have criticised this aspect of his theory in section 3 above. 
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improve our understanding of these cases. Focusing on free will and determinism 
unnecessarily complicates questions that we are capable of answering otherwise. 
 
5.Conclusion 
A couple of years ago, while preparing a seminar for the evidence course at LSE, Mike 
Redmayne and I came across a fascinating passage from Conan Doyle. The passage reads: 
‘…while the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he becomes a 
mathematical certainty. You can, for example, never foretell what any one man will do, but 
you can say with precision what an average number will be up to. Individuals vary, but 
percentages remain constant.’55 Although the passage may sound like an overstatement, we 
have used it since in order to convey to the students that using generalisations in order to 
draw inferences about individual behaviour is a very complex matter. This task involves 
epistemic and possibly also moral problems, which have been examined with admirable 
sophistication in Mike’s Character in the Criminal Trial.  I doubt that I will have a last word 
on this, but I don’t think that the task of drawing inferences about individual behaviour 
involves the problems that Pundik has raised. 
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